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ABSENT ACCOUNTABILITY:  
HOW PROSECUTORIAL IMPUNITY 
HINDERS THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 
 
Scott J. Krischke* 
“The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that 
justice is accomplished.” 
– National District Attorney’s Association1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late afternoon of January 13, 2009, eighteen-year-old 
Rondell Rogers was marched from his jail cell at Orleans Parish 
Prison to Magistrate Court in New Orleans Criminal District 
Court.2 Wearing an orange jumpsuit and the chains required of the 
inmates of Orleans Parish Prison, Rogers took hobbled, jangling 
steps over to the defense table to begin a probable cause hearing. 
Rogers, a local kid from the tough Mid-City neighborhood of New 
                                                          
* Scott J. Krischke, BA DePaul University, JD Candidate Brooklyn Law School 
(expected 2011); Law Clerk for Orleans Public Defenders (2009), Cook County 
Public Defender’s Office (2010), and Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn (2010–
2011); Defense Investigator, Dinolt Becnel & Wells Investigative Group, 
Washington, DC (2007–2011). Special thanks to my Mom and Dad, Jason 
Krischke, Phil Becnel, Stuart Weg, Jon Sabin, Shayna Kessler, the staff of the 
Journal of Law and Policy, all the brave and tireless public defenders 
nationwide, and to the prosecutors who know that justice does not always mean 
a conviction. This article is dedicated to the wrongfully prosecuted and 
convicted men and women in America. 
1 NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS §1.1 ( 2d ed. 1991). 
2 Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, Assistant Pub. Defender, Orleans 
Pub. Defenders (Nov. 5, 2009); State v. Rogers, No. M-496735, 1–2 (Orleans 
Parish Crim. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 17, 2008) (transcript on file with author). 
396 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Orleans, had been working towards a GED3 until December 16, 
2008, when he was picked up by the New Orleans Police 
Department on suspicion of armed robbery and aggravated 
battery.4 By the time of the hearing, Rogers had been incarcerated 
for twenty-eight days and still had not been formally charged by 
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office.5 
Rogers’s arrest arose out of an armed robbery that occurred in 
Mid-City in the late hours of November 28, 2008.6 A little after 11 
p.m. on that night, a twenty-year-old man was approaching his car 
parked on the street when a black male suddenly approached him, 
pointed a handgun at him, and demanded money before striking 
the man in the head with the gun.7 The man gave the assailant his 
money and the assailant fled.8 The victim ultimately reported the 
crime to police, claiming that he recognized the assailant as a kid 
from the neighborhood.9 Shortly thereafter, New Orleans police 
put together a “six pack” photo lineup of young black males from 
the neighborhood who had been recently arrested, including 
Rondell Rogers, and showed it to the victim.10 The victim 
positively identified Rogers, and police secured an arrest warrant.11 
Within days, Rogers was arrested and brought to Orleans Parish 
Prison.12  
                                                          
3 Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2. 
4 Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at 4, 35, State v. Rogers, No. M-
496735 (Orleans Parish Crim. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 17, 2008) (transcript on file 
with author). 
5 After probable cause is established at arraignment and bond is set, the 
State of Louisiana does not require prosecutors to file charges against the 
accused for forty-five days in misdemeanor cases and sixty days in felonies. LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701 (West 2007). Typically, indigent defendants 
cannot afford bond and will wait the full forty-five to sixty days incarcerated 
before prosecutors file charges before they are granted access to substantive 
court proceedings. Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2. 
6 Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 9. 
7 Id. at 4, 9. 
8 Id. at 4. 
9 Id. at 4–5. 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Id. 
12 See Criminal District Court Docket Master Search, ORLEANS PARISH 
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, http://www.opcso.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper& 
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Rogers had been falsely implicated by the victim in this case.13 
But unlike many defendants who have been misidentified, Rogers 
actually had evidence to prove his innocence.14 At the time of the 
robbery, Rogers had been on supervised release—house arrest via 
electronic monitoring—while he awaited the outcome of an earlier 
charge against him in Orleans Parish.15 While that charge would 
ultimately be dismissed,16 the GPS-monitoring records from his 
ankle bracelet recording his location during the time of the robbery 
were preserved.17 Stuart Weg, an Orleans Public Defenders 
attorney representing Rogers, had secured those records along with 
the testimony of Rogers’s case manager, who monitored his ankle 
bracelet, and presented them in court on January 13, 2009.18 The 
case manager’s testimony detailed that at the time of the robbery, 
Rogers was in his home nearly a mile away from where the 
incident took place.19 The prosecuting attorney was given a copy 
of these records during the proceeding.20 
Yet, as Rogers presented this evidence to the magistrate judge, 
the assistant district attorney for Orleans Parish objected three 
times to testimony of Rogers’s case manager regarding the ankle 
bracelet records, including to its record of his whereabouts on 
11:20 p.m. on November 28, 2008.21 The thrust of these arguments 
was that the records were unreliable and unsuitable for court use.22 
These objections came notwithstanding the fact that the district 
attorney’s office and law enforcement routinely use the ankle 
                                                          
view=wrapper&Itemid=183 (search “Last Name” for “Rogers” and search “First 
Name” for “Rondell”; then follow “748800” hyperlink; then follow “496735 / 
M3” hyperlink) (showing initiation of proceedings) (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
13 See id. (search “Last Name” for “Rogers” and search “First Name” for 
“Rondell”; then follow “748800” hyperlink; then follow “483927 / K” 
hyperlink) (showing prosecution ultimately withdrew case on June 30, 2009). 
14 Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 25, 28; see also 
Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2. 
15 Id. 
16  Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4. 
17  Id. at 25. 
18  Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2. 
19  Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 24–36. 
20 Id. at 30. 
21 Id. at 29–32. 
22 Id. at 35–37. 
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bracelet monitoring records in court as reliable evidence to revoke 
bonds and probation of other defendants found in violation of 
supervised release or other reasons.23 At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the magistrate judge found probable cause based on the 
eyewitness identification24 and sent Rogers back to Orleans Parish 
Prison to await trial.25 
Within weeks, and despite having the records clearly placing 
Rogers almost a mile away from the scene of the crime, the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office filed armed robbery 
charges against Rogers.26 Over the course of the next five months, 
Rogers would appear in court six more times, all of which included 
references to the ankle monitoring records and pleas for the 
prosecutors to drop the charges.27 Despite having these records and 
no physical evidence linking Rogers to the crime, prosecutors 
refused.28 Rogers appeared for trial on June 30, 2009.29 Minutes 
                                                          
23 See Gwen Filosa, Judge Jails Kashie Fernandez on Half-Million Dollar 
Bond, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 13, 2009, http://www.nola.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2009/05/judge_jails_kashie_fernandez_o.html (describing how 
prosecutors used Fernandez’s ankle bracelet monitoring records to revoke her 
bond); Laura Maggi, 1 Juvenile Caught, 2 Sought After Escape, NEW ORLEANS 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.nola.com/timespic/stories/index. 
ssf?/base/news-7/1191392627129840.xml&coll=1 (reporting juvenile fugitive 
caught after New Orleans police used his ankle bracelet monitoring to narrow 
his location down to within 100 feet). 
24 Eyewitness identification of the accused has long been regarded as 
highly unreliable and has played a role in more than 75 percent of convictions 
later overturned by DNA testing. See Eyewitness Misidentification, THE 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ 
Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
25  Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 64; see also Criminal 
District Court Docket Master records, supra note 12 (showing no bond was 
posted). 
26 See Criminal District Court Docket Master Search, supra note 12 (search 
“Last Name” for “Rogers” and search “First Name” for “Rondell”; then follow 
“748800” hyperlink; then follow “496735 / M3” hyperlink). 
27 Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2; see also Criminal 
District Court Docket Master records, supra note 12. 
28  Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, supra note 4, at 30; see also Criminal 
District Court Docket Master records, supra note 12 (showing prosecutors asked 
for and received several continuances in the case after dating to December 
2008). 
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before it was to begin, they dismissed the charges against him.30 
He would be released in the early morning hours of the next day 
after spending more than six months in prison.31 His efforts 
towards achieving his GED would need to start from square one, 
but he would finally be able to sleep in his own bed that night. 
While some may find it easy to call the prosecution’s handling 
of Rogers’s case shameful, there is a more difficult question: How 
might prosecutors be held accountable for keeping him imprisoned 
for more than six months despite having clear evidence that he 
could not have committed this crime? The Orleans Parish District 
Attorney’s office does not have an independent body tasked with 
investigating alleged prosecutorial abuses; as such, there is no 
source with authority over the prosecution to which Rogers could 
complain.32 There are no criminal statutes in Louisiana under 
which prosecutors may be prosecuted for this type of abuse.33 
Rogers could bring a federal civil rights action against the District 
Attorney’s office for violation of his due process rights34 but given 
that a magistrate judge had found probable cause based on the 
witness identification in the earlier photo lineup,35 and established 
federal law grants absolute immunity from civil suits brought 
against prosecutors, he would be unlikely to prevail.36 
                                                          
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31  Telephone Interview with Stuart Weg, supra note 2. 
32 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. (West 2010) (showing no statutes 
authorizing independent body to oversee prosecutors).  
33 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. title 14 (West 2007). 
34 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2006) (allowing for civil cause of action 
against those who use a position of governmental authority to deprive someone 
of his or her constitutional rights or privileges). 
35 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
36 Since 1976, prosecutors have functioned under the absolute immunity 
doctrine, which shields them from liability for civil actions brought by those 
charged or convicted as a result of “dishonest action” by prosecutors, including 
maliciously filing charges without probable cause. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409 (1976). The Supreme Court refused to allow such suits as “it would prevent 
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential 
to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.” Id. at 427–28; see also 
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997) (stating that a prosecutor is not 
open to suit if acting within the realm of her duties); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 
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What happened in the case of Rondell Rogers was borne out of 
the wide discretion that prosecuting attorneys enjoy throughout the 
United States. Rondell Rogers is not alone. Abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion is just one way that defendants have found themselves 
denied justice. Recent revelations that prosecutors illegally 
withheld exculpatory evidence concerning defendants37 have led to 
hundreds of overturned convictions.38 Widespread complaints of 
police corruption and overreaching have led to the discovery of 
prosecutors tacitly approving and even encouraging perjured in-
court testimony by police to violate suspects’ constitutional 
rights.39 But despite these well-documented faults in the criminal 
justice system, prosecutors’ offices across the country have failed 
to substantively adapt to the realities of criminal law 
enforcement.40  
Part I of this Note will address the many ways in which 
criminal defendants are denied justice at the hands of prosecutors 
while Part II will document the consequences of a prosecutorial 
system without accountability. These consequences include 
undermined public trust and legitimacy of law enforcement,41 
wasted taxpayer money,42 and the theft of liberty from the 
                                                          
266, 268 (1994) (stating that incarceration without probable cause is not grounds 
for a violation of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
37 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (establishing a 
constitutional due process right that evidence tending to exculpate the defendant 
must be provided to the defense). 
38 See discussion infra Parts I.A–B; see also Ken Armstrong & Maurice 
Possley, Trial & Error: Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 
1999, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial 
1,0,479347.story [hereinafter Trial & Error: Part 1]. 
39 See discussion infra Part I.C; see also CITY OF N.Y., COMM’N TO 
INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT, 36–43 
(1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT]. 
40 See infra Part I. 
41 See infra Part II.A. 
42 This money includes the millions spent retrying overturned convictions, 
defending themselves against lawsuits (and paying those who are successful), 
and imprisoning the wrongfully convicted. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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hundreds of innocent people wrongfully imprisoned.43 Part III will 
propose potential solutions to address these concerns. These 
solutions involve improving the system for filing complaints 
against prosecutors, establishing independent bodies to investigate 
complaints, allowing complaints to be used as subjects for 
disciplinary review of prosecutors, and even the imposition of 
criminal charges in the most egregious of cases. A structured 
system of prosecutorial accountability that addresses these 
common injustices and a redefinition of the function and culture of 
prosecution must be undertaken to reform criminal prosecution and 
ensure a more efficient, effective, and honest criminal justice 
system. Only when we stop placing prosecutors above the law can 
we begin to see a wholesale reform and a greater credibility to the 
operation of our criminal justice system. 
I. COMMON INJUSTICES 
A. Abuse of Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion is essential to the function of the 
prosecutor. This discretion includes deciding when to charge, who 
to charge, what to charge, and when to dismiss.44 Prosecutors are 
tasked with enforcing the criminal laws passed by legislatures and 
must often make hard decisions based on the facts of each 
individualized case and the office’s available resources.45 
Considerations such as a defendant’s prior criminal record and the 
severity of individual offenses require that prosecutors retain 
significant discretion and vesting the decision of whom and how to 
prosecute in an authority outside of a prosecutors’ office is simply 
unworkable.46 The vast implications of this discretion, however, 
                                                          
43 See infra Parts I.A–B. 
44 Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1280–82 
(2002). 
45 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 13–14 (2007). 
46 The Supreme Court has stated that “[e]xamining the basis of a 
prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement 
by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, 
and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s 
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make it rife for abuse. Due to the broad nature of prosecutorial 
discretion, abuses of discretion are impossible to quantify. Abuse 
of discretion arguably occurred in the case of Rondell Rogers, 
where prosecutors ignored and even fought to suppress material 
evidence proving his innocence.47 Other reported instances of 
abuse of discretion include threatening witnesses with trumped up 
or false criminal charges unless they testify in the prosecutor’s 
favor,48 offering jailhouse informants with near zero credibility 
reduced sentences in exchange for favorable testimony against 
another defendant,49 and levying knowingly false allegations 
against defendants and witnesses during opening and closing 
statements at trial.50 All of these practices not only violate common 
sense standards of decency, but also the American Bar 
Association’s standards of professional conduct, the content of 
which all attorneys are required to swear an oath to uphold.51 
Rogers’s ordeal pales in comparison to the abuse of discretion 
involved in the case of Rolando Cruz, who in 1985 was sentenced 
to death in DuPage County, Illinois for the brutal rape and murder 
of ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico.52 Cruz, then nineteen, became a 
person of interest in the case after he attempted to cash in on a 
$10,000 reward by providing fabricated information to police 
investigating the case.53 Despite having no physical evidence 
                                                          
enforcement policy.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
47 See supra notes 1–31 and accompanying text. 
48 DAVIS, supra note 45, at 123–24. 
49 Radley Balko, Absolute Immunity on Trial, REASON MAGAZINE, Nov. 9, 
2009, http://reason.com/archives/2009/11/09/absolute-immunity-on-trial. 
50 Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: Part 2: The Flip Side 
of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/watchdog/chi-020103trial2,0,754391.story [hereinafter Trial & Error: 
Part 2]. 
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002). 
52 Cruz was also convicted with another man, Alejandro Hernandez. 
Rolando Cruz & Alejandro Hernandez, THE JUSTICE PROJECT, http://www.the 
justiceproject.org/profiles/rolando-cruz-and-alejandro-hernandez/ (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2010). Jeanine Nicarico was abducted from her suburban Chicago 
home on February 25, 1983. Her body was found two days later less than two 
miles from her home. Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC ONLINE, Nov. 
1999, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/99nov/9911wrongman.htm.  
53 Berlow, supra note 52. 
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implicating Cruz, an entire case built around the testimony of 
jailhouse snitches, and a written confession to the Nicarico killing 
from Brian Dugan, a previously-confessed child rapist and 
murderer already incarcerated in neighboring LaSalle County, 
prosecutors charged Cruz and his co-defendant, Alejandro 
Hernandez.54 Prosecutors in the Cruz case withheld Dugan’s 
confession from defense attorneys and continued to prosecute 
Cruz, even when his convictions were overturned after Dugan’s 
confession was finally revealed.55 In their case against Cruz, 
prosecutors put police on the stand who told the jury that Cruz had 
made gravely incriminating statements—yet they had no 
recordings of any of these alleged statements.56 Cruz’s conviction 
would be overturned twice over the course of the next decade, and 
each time prosecutors reinstituted charges, including in 1995 after 
receiving modern DNA test results showing Cruz’s DNA was not 
found on Jeanine.57 In November 1995 the charges against Cruz 
and Hernandez were finally dismissed,58 and Cruz was freed after 
spending more than ten years on death row.59 In 1999, three of the 
prosecutors who had continued to charge Cruz and four law 
enforcement officers who claimed in court that he made the 
unrecorded incriminating statements were placed on trial for 
conspiracy to frame Cruz by using false evidence.60 All of them 
                                                          
54 Id. 
55 Cruz & Hernandez, supra note 52. 
56 Know the Cases: Rolando Cruz, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/Content/77.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). A police 
detective, a sheriff’s lieutenant, a state’s attorney, and an assistant attorney 
general all resigned their positions out of protest for the continued prosecution 
of Cruz. Berlow, supra note 52. The police detective would ultimately testify for 
the defense and the sheriff’s lieutenant recanted his testimony as fabrications 
from Cruz’s first trial. See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 645–648 (Ill. 1994); 
Cruz & Hernandez, supra note 52. 
57 Know the Cases: Rolando Cruz, supra note 56. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: Part 3: Prosecution 
on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/watchdog/chi-020103trial3,0,610421.story [hereinafter Trial & Error: 
Part 3]. Other counts included perjury and obstruction of justice. Id. 
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were acquitted.61 
B. Brady Violations 
Prosecutors’ duty to disclose evidence tending to exculpate the 
accused is an oft-cited subject of prosecutorial misconduct.62 On 
July 24, 1976, in Auburn, New York, George Sedor was sitting in 
his car in the parking lot of the restaurant that he owned when two 
unknown gunmen opened fire on him.63 He was shot six times and 
killed.64 His brother, who witnessed the shooting, told police that 
he saw two white men running from the scene.65 Prosecutors kept 
that statement hidden from defense attorneys along with other 
statements taken from witnesses when they arrested Sammy 
Thomas and Willie Gene, both black, and charged them with 
Sedor’s murder.66 Prosecutors secured convictions based on the 
testimony of Steven Wejko, a witness who police believed 
supplied the guns used in Sedor’s murder; they obtained Wejko’s 
                                                          
61 Bob Gibson, When Justice Hides its Face, J. DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N, 
May 2005, at 3, http://www.dcba.org/brief/mayissue/2005/art10505.pdf. But see 
Patrick A. Tuite, The DuPage Seven Case from My Perspective, J. DUPAGE 
COUNTY B. ASS’N, June 2000, http://www.dcba.org/brief/junissue/2000/ 
art040600.htm (arguing that prosecutors acted in good faith). Brian Dugan, the 
original confessed killer of Jeanine Nicarico, pleaded guilty to her rape and 
murder in DuPage County in 2009. Art Barnum, Brian Dugan Admits to 
Nicarico Slaying, Rape, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/news/local/brian-dugan-guilty-090729,0,5402784.story. At sentencing, 
DuPage County prosecutors successfully argued for a death sentence for Dugan. 
Art Barnum & Ted Gregory, Jeanine Nicarico Murder: Tears of Joy as Brian 
Dugan Gets Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/chi-dugan-death-penalty-12-nov12,0,2638852.story. Cruz 
later reached a settlement in a civil suit against the DuPage County State’s 
Attorney’s Office for $3.5 million. Gibson, supra at 3. 
62 See Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38. See also Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing a defendant’s due process right to material 
information tending to prove his innocence).  
63 Walter Rewald, Sedor Decision in Two Weeks, THE CITIZEN (Auburn), 
Jan. 25, 1979, at 1. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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testimony in exchange for a reduced sentence.67 Thomas and 
Gene’s convictions were later overturned after the exculpatory 
witness statements were discovered; the charges against Thomas 
were dropped and Gene was acquitted after the defense entered the 
statements during his retrial.68 The man who originally prosecuted 
them, Peter Corning, went on to become a judge.69  
In 1977, after an evening playing bingo, ninety-two-year-old 
Emma Crapser was returning to her home in Poughkeepsie, New 
York, when an unidentified assailant attacked her, severely beating 
and suffocating her.70 In 1983, Dewey Bozella, eighteen-years-old 
at the time of the incident and with a history of petty crime, was 
convicted of Crapser’s murder.71 Prosecutors had no physical 
evidence linking Bozella to the murder and relied entirely on 
testimony from jailhouse informants who testified in exchange for 
reduced sentences, were admittedly under the influence of drugs at 
the time of the crime, and who provided inconsistent accounts.72 In 
2009, private attorneys who took on Bozella’s case pro bono found 
old notes from a retired police lieutenant that implicated another 
man, Donald Wise, in the crime.73 Bozella’s attorneys then filed 
freedom of information requests and discovered a taped police 
interview of a witness who told police that he watched Donald 
Wise planning a burglary near the Crapser apartment and described 
how Wise may have already killed another woman.74 Police found 
a fingerprint at the scene of the crime that would eventually be 
positively matched to Wise, who had been subsequently convicted 
                                                          
67 New York State (Exclusive of New York City), VICTIMS OF THE STATE, 
http://www.victimsofthestate.org/NY/indexNYS.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2010). 
68 Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38. 
69 Id. 
70 Joel Stashenko, Citing Withheld Evidence, Judge Orders Third Trial in 
1977 Slaying, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 2009, at 1, col. 4. 
71 Peter Applebome, Unyielding in His Innocence, Now a Free Man, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/nyregion/29towns. 
html. 
72 Stashenko, supra note 70, at 1, col. 4. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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for a near-identical murder in the same neighborhood.75 After 
Bozella was granted a retrial in October 2009 in light of this 
evidence, prosecutors dropped the charges against him.76 
Thomas, Gene, and Bozella were all victims of prosecutors 
who failed to disclose evidence tending to exculpate the accused. 
Disclosure of such evidence is a constitutional due process right of 
all criminal defendants established by the Supreme Court in 
1963.77 The Supreme Court established the rule to ensure that the 
accused is granted a fair trial.78 It is designed to remind the 
prosecutor of the responsibility to administer justice and that the 
“system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused 
is treated unfairly.”79 The decision embodied the earlier words of 
Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland, opining that the 
prosecutor, “while he may strike hard blows, is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones.”80 As the cases above demonstrate, the problem of 
prosecutors withholding exculpatory evidence persists.81 An 
                                                          
75 Applebome, supra note 71. 
76 Id. 
77 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). The Supreme Court 
established three elements of a Brady violation: “[1] The evidence at issue must 
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either 
willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, it 
must be shown that the evidence was material to the outcome. See id. at 282. 
78 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
79 Id. 
80 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The quote continues, “It 
is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated 
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.” Id. 
81 For more examples of cases that have been overturned after prosecutors 
withheld evidence, see Estes Thompson, N.C. Man Acquitted of Murder, 
CHARLOTTE NEWS-OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2004, http://www.truthinjustice.org/ 
Alan-Gell.htm (man sentenced to death for murder in 1995 acquitted after 
prosecutors concealed interviews with seventeen witnesses that proved suspect 
was in police custody at time of murder); Jennifer Emily, Man Released from 
Jail After Judge Recommends Lifting Sexual Assault Conviction, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ 
dws/news/dmn/stories/111808dnmetjohnson.1c09af252.html (two sexual assault 
convictions overturned after it was revealed that prosecutors failed to turn over 
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investigation conducted in 1999 by the Chicago Tribune found that 
between 1963 and 1999, at least 381 defendants nationwide had a 
homicide conviction thrown out after revelations that prosecutors 
concealed exculpatory evidence and presented evidence in court 
they knew to be false.82 Of those cases, sixty-seven had been 
sentenced to death.83  
C. Perjured Police Testimony 
Michael Dowd was arrested in May 1992 by the Suffolk 
County Police Department on charges that he was running a mid-
level cocaine ring through Brooklyn and Suffolk County, New 
York.84 The case would not be unique aside from the fact that 
Dowd and his five co-defendants were all officers of the New York 
Police Department.85 The highly-publicized arrests served as the 
bellwether for an investigation of New York City Police 
Department (“NYPD”) practices and tactics and led to the creation 
of what would later be known as the Mollen Commission.86 The 
findings of the near two-year investigation were released in July 
1994 and documented numerous instances of police corruption, a 
culture devoid of accountability, and systemic violations of 
citizens’ rights by police.87 Aside from the blatant corruption in the 
                                                          
police interview notes with alleged victims in which they stated assault never 
occurred); Richard A. Webster, Life Sentence: Justice Elusive for Wrongfully 
Convicted Victims, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUSINESS, June 4, 2007, http://www.r-
a-e.org/press/life-sentence-justice-elusive-wrongfully-convicted-victims (man 
acquitted after eighteen years in prison after former prosecutor admitted on his 
deathbed that he withheld blood evidence that would exonerate him). 
82 Trial & Error: Part 1, supra note 38. 
83 Id. 
84 See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 91. 
85 Richard Lacayo, Jordan Bonfante & Sharon Epperson, Cops and 
Robbers, TIME, Oct. 11, 1993, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,979358,00.html. 
86 Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An 
Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (1995–1996). 
87 See id. The investigation concluded with the firing of dozens of officers 
and the institution of “integrity tests” administered at random to officers. Chris 
Smith, The Police Police, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 22, 1997, http://nymag.com/news/ 
features/49093/. 
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Dowd case and others, the commission uncovered an established 
tradition of police officers concealing violations of suspects’ 
constitutional rights by falsifying arrest reports and later, if needed, 
committing perjury when questioned in court about obtaining that 
evidence.88 Police, knowledgeable of the constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure,89 as well as the fact that 
any evidence arising out of a search in violation of this right is 
inadmissible at trial,90 were found to consistently lie about how 
evidence was obtained.91 A common illustration of this is when 
police officers stop a car with no probable cause to believe that the 
driver has committed any crime.92 The driver is immediately 
ordered out of the car and without asking, police conduct searches 
of his car and person, discovering a bag of cocaine and a gun. The 
arresting officers later write up the report and subsequently testify 
that they saw the man run a red light and, upon speaking with him, 
the defendant permitted the officers to search the car.93 
Prosecutors throughout the country have acknowledged this 
problem and have expressed frustration in dealing with perjured 
testimony from police.94 The dilemma for the prosecutor arises 
when police officers approach that prosecutor with cases in which 
                                                          
88 See Baer & Armao, supra note 86, at 76–77.   
89 See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 38. 
90 This is commonly known as the “exclusionary rule.” See Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
91 MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 38. 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“[T]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); see also MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 38. 
93 Several legal writers have referred to this practice as “testilying.”  See, 
e.g., Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1341 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to 
Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV 1037 (1996). Other ways police falsify reports 
include “throw down” or “dropsy” cases, where the police officer claims that the 
defendant threw narcotics on the ground after he approached him, effectively 
waiving his Fourth Amendment rights. See People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 
194, 197 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1970) (stating that judges should view “dropsy” 
cases with “especial caution”). 
94 Larry Cunningham, Taking on Testilying: The Prosecutor’s Response to 
In-Court Police Deception, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 26, 31 (1999). 
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there had been a likely violation of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights, yet there is no solid proof of the violation aside from the 
defendant’s testimony.95 Ideally, prosecutors will investigate the 
case further and dismiss it if it proves untrustworthy.96 But in 
reality, prosecutors will often ignore these violations and place the 
officer on the stand.97 At worst, they will encourage and coach 
officers to change their testimony as to the facts of the arrest to 
ensure the evidence is admitted.98 Almost always, and often in 
spite of clear evidence that the police violated constitutional rights, 
the evidence will be admitted as long as the story is not proven to 
be impossible.99 While the Mollen Commission stated that it could 
not quantify the instances of police perjury,100 an investigation of 
Chicago’s criminal justice system included surveys of judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, of which more than 50 percent 
agreed that at least “half of the time prosecutors knew or had 
reason to know” a testifying officer was lying.101 Of the 
prosecutors, 89 percent stated that they believed police perjury 
occurs “at least some of the time.”102  
The American Bar Association strictly prohibits an attorney 
from “knowingly . . . offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to 
                                                          
95 See id. at 28. 
96 See id. at 32. 
97 See Alan M. Dershowitz, Op-Ed., Controlling the Cops; Accomplices to 
Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/ 
05/02/opinion/controlling-the-cops-accomplices-to-perjury.html (describing 
prosecutors’ “muteness” on the issue). 
98 Cunningham, supra note 94, at 31. 
99 See Carol A. Chase, Rampart: A Crying Need to Restore Police 
Accountability, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 772–73 (2001) (describing how 
judges rarely, if ever, suppress evidence despite improbable police testimony 
unless there is direct extrinsic evidence contradicting that testimony); see also 
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 51 (1997) [hereinafter REASONABLE DOUBTS]. 
100 See MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 42. 
101 Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Healer Factor: An 
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 109 
(1992). 
102 Id. Allegations of perjured testimony played a major role in the O.J. 
Simpson murder prosecution when prosecutors attempted to enter the now-
infamous “bloody glove.” REASONABLE DOUBTS, supra note 99, at 80–86. 
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be false.”103 In fact, it is a federal felony to procure or encourage 
perjury.104 Still, police, prosecutors, and judges often ignore the  
practice of false testimony by looking at it as a means justifying 
the ends of law enforcement, seeing the fourth amendment as a 
protection of the guilty and the act of lying to get around it as 
merely “evening the odds” in the war on drugs.105 The difficulty 
for the prosecutor in confronting this problem rests not only in 
accusing his co-workers—the police—of lying, but in determining 
when a lie is being told or when officers are “shading” testimony 
to certain facts but not others.106 Even those prosecutors who 
would stand against perjured testimony face uncooperative police 
officers, indifferent investigators sent from the very police 
department they are tasked with investigating, and the possibility 
of implicating co-workers who have knowingly accepted perjured 
testimony.107 This is not to say that prosecutors have never acted 
against this problem. Former Manhattan District Attorney Robert 
Morgenthau, for example, prosecuted several police officers for 
perjury after they lied under oath.108 Aside from the inherent 
problems with investigating and proving these claims, a prosecutor 
could not be found guilty of subornation of perjury unless it can be 
proven that he or she  “should have known” that the police-witness 
would testify falsely.109 In addition, simple strict enforcement of 
these rules could potentially implicate a number of problems in 
practice. Even if these charges could be proven, prosecutors are 
unlikely to charge one of their own.110 Moreover, broadly pressing 
charges against prosecutors in this way could have a severe 
                                                          
103 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). 
104 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1622 (West 2006) (providing that “[w]hoever 
procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both”). 
105 MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 39, at 42–43. See also Cunningham, supra 
note 94, at 27 (“Testilying is seen as morally acceptable, however, because it is 
deception used against someone (the defendant) who is himself morally 
blameworthy”). 
106 Cunningham, supra note 94 at 32. 
107 See id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 32. 
110 See generally id. at 32–33 
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chilling effect on prosecutors’ willingness to put police officers on 
the stand, even if their testimony is true but seemingly suspect.111 
This could seriously hamper legitimate law enforcement efforts.112 
II. UNDERMINING LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A. Public Distrust 
The explosive increase in the prison population in recent years 
and the racial disparity in the targets of criminal prosecutions and 
incarceration have garnered an enormous amount of attention.113 
Between 1980 and 2007, the prison incarceration rate of people 
living in the United States increased by more than 350 percent—
nearly 11 times faster than the growth of the nation’s population.114 
Among the communities most affected by law enforcement is the 
black community, which, in 2009, comprised 28 percent of the 
people charged with crimes in the United States, despite 
                                                          
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES WORSE (2009) 
(discussing how incarceration of large segments of adult males from minority 
communities contribute to social problems and perpetuation of criminal 
offenders in families); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999) 
(documenting the massive expansion of the prison population and its effect on 
racial communities); JONATHAN R. SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 141 
(2007) (stating that African Americans born in 2001 have a greater probability 
of going to jail than they do of going to college, getting married, or joining the 
military); Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The 
Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202 (2007) 
(demonstrating an often inadvertent difference in charging and plea bargaining 
along class and racial lines and the need for conscious reform among 
prosecutors). 
114 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND PRISONERS IN 2008, (2008) available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm; USA QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
(Aug. 16, 2010) http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. This 
increase comes despite a 32 percent decrease in the violent crime rate since 
1989. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, table 1 
(2009) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES]. 
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representing just under 13 percent of the population.115 Perhaps 
more representative of the vast racial divide in law enforcement is 
the fact that in 2009, 40 percent of the total prison population was 
black, while whites were charged with nearly 70 percent of all 
crimes that same year.116 The community with the highest rate of 
contact with the criminal justice system also often harbors a strong 
distrust towards law enforcement.117 However, it is not the amount 
of charges alone that causes this suspicion—many in the black 
community have cited concerns such as unfair treatment, wrongful 
arrests, and failure to solve crimes as factors in their distrust of law 
enforcement.118 The importance that prosecutorial misconduct has 
played in public opinion and the legitimacy of law enforcement has 
not gone unnoticed. Highly-publicized stories of exonerations after 
revelations of prosecutorial misconduct have led state bar 
associations to criticize prosecutors who bring “the judicial system 
into disrepute by their conduct.”119  
Aside from the damaging instances of wrongful convictions, 
prosecutors’ increased use of “snitches” in criminal prosecutions 
—informants testifying for leniency in their own cases—has been 
cited as a large factor in public suspicion of law enforcement,120 
                                                          
115 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 114, at table 43; USA 
Quickfacts, supra note 114. 
116 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 114; HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, MID-YEAR 2009 PRISON STATISTICS (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf. 
117 A survey of several polls found that 17–30 percent of the black 
community has “little to no faith” in the police. Loretta J. Stalans, Codes of 
Ethics, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 188, 194 (Jack R. Greene ed., 
2007) (citing V.J. ROBERTS & L.J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2000)). 
118 Id. at 194–95. 
119 Joseph Neff, Reprimands in Gell Case, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
NC), Sept. 25, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.bluelineradio.com/ 
GELLPROSECUTORS.html. 
120 See Alexandra Natapoff, Bait and Snitch: The High Cost of Snitching 
for Law Enforcement, SLATE (Dec. 12, 2005, 5:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2132092/ [hereinafter Bait and Snitch]. Natapoff, an associate professor of 
law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, has written extensively on this subject. 
See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004) [hereinafter Snitching] (arguing 
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particularly because the use of snitches often results in false 
information used to secure what are eventually proven to be 
wrongful convictions.121 In some high-crime urban communities, 
where as many as 50 percent of black males between the ages of 
eighteen and thirty-five are under some kind of court supervision at 
any given time,122 a large number of offenders seeking leniency 
will initiate contact with prosecutors in an attempt to “turn state’s 
witness” to avoid prison time.123 This use of informant testimony 
can be a valid and important tool for criminal investigators and 
prosecutors looking to enlist assistance in building their cases 
against some of society’s most dangerous criminals, as “snitches” 
may in some instances be the only witnesses to these activities.124 
However, the pervasive and largely unsupervised use of snitch 
testimony by prosecutors, including the use of unreliable and 
inconsistent testimony, has been strongly criticized.125 Prosecutors’ 
use of snitches is the leading cause for wrongful capital 
convictions in the United States—false testimony from snitches 
played a role in nearly 46 percent of the cases of death row 
exonerees between 1973 and 2004.126 Their reliance on snitches 
undermines police legitimacy as law enforcement is increasingly 
seen to be on the side of unrepentant criminals who would lie 
about others’ involvement in crimes to receive leniency from law 
enforcement and continue their own criminal activities.127 Further, 
the practice of police to arrest members of the community only to 
pressure them to snitch to evade facing a criminal charge has 
                                                          
that the use of snitches actually increases crime and often leads to the 
prosecution of innocent people with whom snitches have vendettas). 
121 See ROB WARDEN, NW. UNIV. CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE 
SNITCH SYSTEM (Winter 2004–2005). 
122 Snitching, supra note 120, at 646 n.7 (referring to high crime 
communities in Baltimore, MD and Washington, DC). 
123 See Bait and Snitch, supra note 120. 
124 See Brian Lieberman, Ethical Issues in the Use of Confidential 
Informants for Narcotics Operations, POLICE CHIEF (June 2007), http://police 
chiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=12
10&issue_id=62007. 
125 See Snitching, supra note 120. 
126 See WARDEN, supra note 121, at 3. 
127 Bait and Snitch, supra note 120. 
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resulted in a growing sentiment of community “victimization” by 
police and has even fostered violence towards those accused of 
being snitches, further undermining law enforcement legitimacy in 
high-crime, urban communities.128  
Sociologists have found that in urban neighborhoods, a rise in 
negative perceptions of police legitimacy directly correlates to a 
rise in violent crime.129 In order for communities to accept the law 
as moral and legitimate, its members must first believe the law and 
its procedures to be fair.130 As community members begin to feel 
marginalized by a law enforcement system perceived as corrupt, 
they will refuse to cooperate with police and reject seeking police 
assistance to resolve conflicts—instead choosing to take the law 
into their own hands.131 Compromised law enforcement legitimacy 
will not only affect the opinions of potential criminal offenders, 
but will even do so for law-abiding members of communities who 
face pressure not to report crimes to a law enforcement system 
viewed as uncaring and corrupt.132 A twenty-two-year study of 
disadvantaged and poverty-stricken precincts in New York City 
found that increases in police misconduct and over-enforcement of 
non-violent crimes predicted increases in violent crime in those 
neighborhoods.133 Another study conducted in Trinidad and 
Tobago documented how positive perceptions of law 
enforcement—stimulated by the introduction of community 
policing initiatives and frequent monitoring of police honesty and 
                                                          
128 Id. In Baltimore, MD in 2004, a threatening underground DVD was 
produced entitled, “Stop Snitching.” The DVD featured commentary from local 
teens and drug dealers threatening violence against anyone who became a police 
informant and included a number of graphic images of murder victims who the 
video claimed to be snitches. Rick Hampson, Anti-Snitch Campaign Riles 
Police, Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/2006-03-28-stop-snitching_x.htm. 
129 See Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of 
Violent Crime in Structurally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 
469, 490–91 (2005). 
130 With a general perception of procedural fairness will come communal 
acceptance of law enforcement, even when its consequences may be 
unfavorable. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 109 (1990). 
131 Kane, supra note 129, at 470. 
132 See id. at 474. 
133 Id. at 491. 
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fairness—led to greater collective community efficacy and an 
overall consistent drop in violent crime.134 Central to these findings 
was the conclusion that law enforcement officials have the power 
to trigger increases in collective efficacy, corresponding with 
decreases in violent crime, simply by providing fair and lawful 
services to the community.135 
B. Cost to Taxpayers 
While prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability 
in nearly all federal civil rights actions,136 seventeen states permit 
lawsuits against prosecutors or allow for automatic statutory 
indemnification for the wrongfully convicted.137 Still, the state and 
                                                          
134 See Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Legitimacy as a Mechanism for Police to 
Promote Collective Efficacy and Reduce Crime and Disorder 183–87 (Spring 
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University) (on file with 
author). 
135 See id. at 186. 
136 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also Adam I. Kaplan, 
The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 227, 233 (2008) (observing that “[s]uccessful tort suits against 
the government or government officials are rare due to sovereign immunity and 
various substantial burdens of proof”). 
137 James L. Buchwalter, Cause of Action or Claim Under State Statute 
Providing Remedy for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration, in CAUSES OF 
ACTION SECOND SERIES § 2 (2004), available at Westlaw, 25 COA2d 579. In 
Texas, passage of the Tim Cole Act (named after a wrongfully convicted man 
who died in prison) in 2009 provides the wrongfully convicted with a lump sum 
payment of $80,000 per year of incarceration, including college payments. 
Hilary Hylton, Texas: The Kinder, Gentler Hang ‘Em High State, TIME, Sept. 
19, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1924278,00.html. In 
New York, tort actions against the state are permissible for the exonerated, 
provided that the plaintiff can prove that “he did not commit any of the acts” for 
which he was charged. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 8-b(2), 8-b(5)(c) (McKinney 2007). 
In Illinois, the wrongfully convicted can receive up to $199,150, related to the 
total time spent imprisoned, provided they first obtain a “certificate of 
innocence” from a state Circuit Court. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 
(West 2010). But see Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, Free and Uneasy–A 
Long Road Back After Exoneration, and Justice is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25dna.html 
(showing that as of August 2007, forty percent of those exonerated nationwide 
by DNA evidence since 1989 had not been compensated at all). 
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federal statutes that compensate the wrongfully convicted allow for 
causes of action only against the state and federal government, 
meaning that successful claims for wrongful prosecution and 
conviction by exonerated defendants are paid for out of taxpayer 
dollars.  
There is no cumulative study documenting the total amount 
taxpayers have paid to settle civil liabilities brought on by the 
unjustly convicted, but the media has followed a number of these 
settlements closely.138 In California, Santa Clara County has paid 
out $4.6 million in settlements to the wrongfully convicted since 
2005.139 Texas taxpayers have covered more than $8.8 million in 
compensation to the exonerated since 2001.140 And in Illinois, the 
DuPage County Board voted in 2000 to pay out $3.5 million to 
settle lawsuits brought against its State’s Attorney’s Office filed by 
Rolando Cruz for his wrongful capital conviction in the Jeanine 
Nicarico case.141 
These figures do not include the money the state must spend to 
defend these civil suits.142 For example, a wrongful conviction suit 
in Union County, North Carolina netted a $3.9 million settlement 
in 2009 to Alan Gell, who was sentenced to death in 1995 when 
prosecutors failed to turn over more than a dozen exculpatory 
witness interviews and a recorded phone conversation in which the 
state’s star witness spoke with a friend about framing Gell.143 In 
that case, the State Bureau of Investigation spent $731,000 
                                                          
138 See infra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. 
139 John F. Terzano, The Costs of Wrongful Convictions Continues to Rise, 
JUSTICE PROJECT (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.thejusticeproject.org/blog/the-
costs-of-wrongful-convictions-continue-to-rise/. 
140 Jennifer Emily & Steven McGonigle, Dallas County District Attorney 
Wants Unethical Prosecutors Punished, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4, 2008, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/DN-
misconduct_04met.ART0.State.Edition2.46518c2.html. 
141 DuPage County Board Settles Cruz Lawsuits for $3.5 Million, CHI.-SUN 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at A1. See also supra notes 52–61 and accompanying 
text. 
142 See supra notes 139–41 (showing no mention of attorneys’ fees in either 
the criminal cases or civil actions). 
143 The High Costs of a Wrongful Conviction, Op-Ed., CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/408/story/9899 
35.html. 
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defending itself from that suit before finally agreeing to the 
settlement.144 Factor in the cost of housing the average prisoner in 
the United States at $22,650 a year and the financial ramifications 
of faulty convictions become apparent.145 Furthermore, this 
breakdown does not include the costs of the initial felony 
prosecutions, which vary widely and have not been cumulatively 
quantified.146 And when the stakes are high, so are the costs. 
Securing an average death penalty conviction—whether the 
defendant is innocent or guilty—costs taxpayers $1.9 million more 
than a non-death penalty conviction.147 
C. The Human Cost 
“I’m free, but I’m trapped, and no matter how much I run, 
I’ll never make up for the lost time.” 
– Jeff Deskovic, 34, who spent sixteen years in prison in 
New York for rape and murder before a DNA 
exoneration.148 
 
The most damaging of the injuries caused by a lack of 
prosecutorial accountability are those suffered by the victims of 
prosecutorial misconduct. On May 9, 2003, John Thompson 
stepped from the gates of the Orleans Parish Prison and into the 
southern Louisiana sun.149 Clutching only a small bag of 
                                                          
144 Id. 
145 See JAMES J. STEPHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES 2, 3 (2001) (reporting that operating 
costs among state penitentiaries in all fifty states averaged $22,650 per inmate in 
2001). 
146 See Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010) (providing information on the costs of capital prosecutions in both the 
federal and state systems). 
147 See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., THE COST OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN MARYLAND (2008), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/CostsDP 
Maryland.pdf. 
148 Fernanda Santos, Vindicated by DNA, But a Lost Man on the Outside, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25 
jeffrey.html. 
149 Gwen Filosa, N.O. Man Cleared in ‘84 Murder, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
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possessions and the ten dollars given to him by the Louisiana 
Department of Corrections for bus fare,150 Thompson walked 
slowly away from the past eighteen years he spent incarcerated at 
Angola State Prison,151 the largest maximum security prison in the 
United States.152 But after spending more than eighteen years 
behind bars—including fourteen spent on death row—away from 
his family, friends, and society, Thompson had no idea how he 
would restart his life.153  
Thompson was exonerated for the 1984 murder of Ray Liuzza 
in New Orleans after he was granted a retrial when a New Orleans 
judge learned of an assistant district attorney’s death bed 
confession that he hid blood evidence that could have cleared 
Thompson.154 Thompson is not alone.155 More than five hundred 
people have been released from prison following exonerations for 
wrongful convictions.156 On average, they spend more than twelve 
years in prison before they prove their innocence.157 The 
readjustment process is often jarring.158 A 2005 study found that a 
few months after their release, two-thirds are not financially 
independent, one-third face long legal battles to regain custody of 
children taken away when they were wrongfully convicted, and 
one in four suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder relating to 
                                                          
PICAYUNE, May 9, 2003, http://truthinjustice.org/John-Thompson.htm. 
150 Webster, supra note 81. 
151 See id.  
152 See Melinda Stone, Angola Prison and Prison Museum, THE LAY OF 
THE LAND (Ctr. for Land Use Interpretation, Culver City, Cal.), Summer 1998, 
at 3, available at http://www.clui.org/lotl/pdf/14_summer1998.pdf (noting that 
Angola is one of the largest prisons in the United States and the largest, by area); 
see also THE FARM: ANGOLA, USA (Gabriel Films 1998). 
153 Webster, supra note 81. 
154 Id. 
155 See About, LIFE AFTER EXONERATION PROGRAM, http://www. 
exonerated.org/content/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&I
temid=53 (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
156 Id. 
157 Id.  
158 See generally The Exonerated, LIFE AFTER EXONERATION PROGRAM, 
http://www.exonerated.org/content/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=47&Itemid=54 (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
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their incarceration.159 Re-entry services, such as job training and 
residency assistance available to parolees in the states that offer 
them, are not offered to exonerees.160 Despite their innocence, 
most exonerees face the same challenges as the guilty when they 
are released from prison, including chronic unemployment, lack of 
health care, drug addiction, homelessness, and the social stigma 
associated with the formerly incarcerated.161 “Any time that 
anyone has been in prison, even if you are exonerated, there is still 
a stigma about you, and you are walking around with a scarlet 
letter,” explained exoneree Ken Wyniemko, in an interview in The 
New York Times.162 That stigma is further exacerbated by states’ 
traditionally slow responses in clearing the wrongful convictions 
from criminal records, if they do so at all.163 Perhaps the greatest 
price is in the loss of youth for the wrongfully convicted—most are 
convicted in their twenties and spend an average of twelve years 
behind bars164—and the difficulty of returning to a normal life after 
having spent more than a decade removed from society.165 
The majority of states do not offer civil remedies for the 
wrongfully convicted.166 Those that do often require long legal 
battles, set strict limits on how much a plaintiff can receive, and 
exonerees can rarely satisfy the heavy burden of proving their 
innocence and lack of involvement in any crime that is typically 
required in such statutes.167 Between 1985, when New York 
established a civil remedy for the wrongfully convicted, and 2001, 
the success rate of these lawsuits hovered around 7 percent.168 
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165 For an in-depth look at the individual stories of 137 exonerees, see 
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Nationwide, 40 percent of former inmates cleared through DNA 
evidence did not receive any compensation for the years they spent 
in prison for crimes they did not commit.169 
John Thompson’s realization of these chronic and consistent 
problems among the wrongfully convicted and recently freed 
caused him to found the New Orleans-based Resurrection After 
Exoneration.170 Resurrection After Exoneration, a non-profit 
organization, provides exonerees throughout the South with 
services such as job training, transitional housing, health insurance 
subsidies, and support group meetings.171 And while Thompson 
has found a positive outlet for his frustration over the eighteen 
years he spent in prison by helping others in similar situations, the 
root cause of his incarceration remains unresolved: a lack of 
meaningful disciplinary action against the prosecutors who 
concealed evidence of his innocence while seeking the death 
penalty against him. “They call it malfeasance of office and get a 
slap on the wrist while I’m up at Angola on death row for 18 
years,” Thompson told New Orleans City Business newspaper in 
June 2007.172 “Somebody help me understand this.”173 
III. FINDING SOLUTIONS 
A. Changing Prosecutorial Culture 
Professionals and legal scholars of the criminal justice system 
often come to one conclusion when asked why prosecutors hide 
evidence and put witnesses on the stand they know to be lying—
they do it to win.174 Most people understand the role of attorneys 
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2010). Resurrection After Exoneration is an “offspring” of the Innocence Project 
New Orleans. RESURRECTION AFTER EXONERATION, http://www.r-a-e.org/home 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
171 Services, RESURRECTION AFTER EXONERATION, http://www.r-a-e.org/ 
programs/services (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
172 Webster, supra note 81. 
173 Id. 
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as ethical and diligent advocates for their clients, whether they are 
a personal injury attorney representing an injured motorist or a 
contract specialist negotiating on behalf of a Fortune 500 
company.175 However, this traditional understanding of the 
attorney as an advocate does not fully carry over to prosecutors, at 
least in theory.176 Prosecutors have officially described themselves 
as advocates primarily for the administration of justice.177 The 
Supreme Court adopted this definition in a 1935 review of 
allegations of misconduct of an assistant United States Attorney, 
stating that the prosecutor “is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy . . . and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.”178 Unfortunately, this theory has not always been 
the standard for prosecutors in reality. Legendary twentieth century 
trial attorney Clarence Darrow once stated that lawyers always aim 
to seek justice, however, “justice” to a prosecutor is often seen as a 
guilty verdict of the defendant.179 This mindset has also taken more 
extreme forms. In Illinois, prosecutors were excoriated in the 
media when the public learned of their “two-ton contest”—a 
running bet between prosecutors who vied to be the first in the year 
to convict defendants whose compiled weight was more than 4,000 
pounds.180 
It is a regular practice for prosecutors’ offices to keep track of 
the conviction rates of its attorneys and often provide these figures 
                                                          
175 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002). 
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as evidence of success.181 However, the moment that one comes to 
the realization that not all people charged with crimes are guilty, 
the notion of keeping a tally of conviction rates and rewarding 
those prosecutors with the highest rates becomes defunct. Keeping 
score and pushing prosecutors to attain higher conviction rates 
presumes that all those arrested by police are guilty and therefore 
runs contrary to the cornerstone of criminal justice in democracies: 
that defendants are innocent until proven guilty.182 
Therefore, it is the recommendation of this author that, as an 
integral first step to fundamentally overhauling the culture of 
prosecutors’ offices, conviction rate-tallying should be outlawed. 
Using the obtainment of a conviction as the prosecutor’s 
fundamental goal encourages abuses of discretion, hiding 
exculpatory evidence, and putting on false testimony, whether 
these improprieties are intentional or unintentional. When 
prosecutors understand and fall in line with their defined role as 
ministers of justice and not advocates solely for conviction, a 
collective shift in mindset can begin to take place. 
Still, comprehensive reform of the culture within prosecutors’ 
offices must also deal with the nature of the prosecutorial culture: 
                                                          
181 See Carl Hessler Jr., County Prosecutors Maintained High Conviction 
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prosecutors often seek credit and praise for high conviction rates, 
try to build their own collection of “war stories,” and share these 
stories to feel like a part of the team.183 While strong feelings 
cannot and should not be discouraged among prosecutors when 
they obtain a conviction against a factually guilty defendant whose 
rights were respected, there must be an effort to distinguish those 
cases from the ones where prosecutors do whatever it takes to 
preserve a perfect conviction rate.184 Reform, then, should also 
include enhanced inter-office visibility when prosecuting attorneys 
wrongfully obtain convictions. For example, offices should share 
reports of instances when prosecutorial wrongdoing was uncovered 
and these reports should be included as part of required training of 
prosecutors by their offices. This will help to not only prevent 
similar abuses in the future but also to further endorse the 
understanding that prosecutors are ministers of justice and not 
simply advocates for conviction.  
Even with internal reform, pressure for convictions will still 
persist, as the charge for convictions is often compounded by the 
strong influence of the media and a public clamoring for 
convictions and the death penalty for certain suspects, even when 
those people may be innocent or legally undeserving of such 
punishment.185 Therefore, a second prong, involving increased 
transparency of prosecutorial actions must be adopted to combat 
these strong urges. In the past, supervisors have responded to a 
prosecutor who refuses to press charges against someone that he or 
she believes to be innocent by punishing, terminating, or simply 
forcing the prosecutor to give up the case.186 Instead, those who 
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have refused to further prosecute cases should be given an official 
channel for filing an independent review of those charges.187 When 
one of these cases is not pursued—and there was clear and 
convincing evidence of the defendant’s innocence—the prosecutor 
who refused to prosecute should be commended within her office 
and to the media. While the general public carries strong opinions 
toward holding the guilty accountable, it has also demonstrated 
revulsion for cases in which defendants are wrongfully 
convicted.188 Speaking with the media about prosecutors who 
noticed errors and refused to prosecute further will serve to bolster 
the credibility and legitimacy of prosecutors and law enforcement 
among society as true champions of justice, and in turn, should 
reduce crime.189 A shift away from a victory-at-all-costs mentality, 
combined with increased visibility of prosecutors’ faults and 
positive examples of the true administration of justice will work 
synergistically to shape the characteristics of prosecutors’ office to 
their intended role as ministers of justice and not advocates for 
conviction. This will thereby help to eliminate the recurrence of 
embarrassing wrongful convictions and harmful abuses of 
discretion. 
B. Expanding Civil Liability 
On October 6, 2010, the United States Supreme Court heard 
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oral arguments in the case of Connick v. Thompson, a Fifth Circuit 
decision stemming from an appeal by the New Orleans District 
Attorney’s office of a $14 million judgment granted to John 
Thompson, a man wrongfully convicted after prosecutors hid 
exculpatory evidence.190 The case comes on the heels of a 
settlement in the earlier case of Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 
where in November 2009 the Supreme Court heard oral arguments 
that examined the issue of absolute prosecutorial immunity, even 
in light of prosecutors who secured convictions by knowingly 
fabricating evidence.191 After arguments, the case was withdrawn 
due to an agreed settlement.192 If Thompson is successful, the 
decision will represent the first crack in the once-thought 
impenetrable shield of prosecutorial immunity from federal civil 
liability for wrongful convictions,193 particularly where the 
prosecutor’s office failed to properly train its assistant prosecuting 
attorneys on the rules of Brady.194 In Thompson, the primary policy 
concerns of the Supreme Court in establishing absolute immunity 
were in preventing frivolous and time-wasting lawsuits against 
prosecutors, the “chilling effect” that the threat of civil suits could 
bring to the prosecutor’s execution of duty, and “the possibility 
that [the prosecutor] would shade his decisions instead of 
exercising the independence of judgment required by his public 
trust.”195 During oral arguments in the McGhee case, Supreme 
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Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, herself a former Manhattan 
prosecutor,196 questioned the theory that imposing civil liability on 
prosecutors who present false evidence would cause too much 
second-guessing of possible evidence and affect the performance 
of their duty to administer justice.197 “A prosecutor is not going to 
flinch when he suspects evidence is perjured or fabricated?” 
Sotomayor asked. “Do you really want to send a message to police 
officers that they should not merely flinch but stop if they have 
reason to believe that evidence is fabricated?”198 Sotomayor hit the 
nail on the head—for far too long prosecutors have enjoyed 
absolute immunity, regardless of the level of their misconduct, 
which has contributed to a dependence on taking actions that carry 
no consequences as well as collective apathy towards defendants’ 
rights. 
The numbers indicate that expanding civil liability has very 
little impact on conviction rates and prosecutorial practice. In the 
seventeen states and the District of Columbia that have passed 
legislation providing civil remedies against prosecutors for those 
who have been wrongfully convicted there has been little change to 
the prison population.199 In fact, in 2009, district attorneys’ offices 
in the five boroughs of New York City reported a 91 percent 
average felony conviction rate,200 despite the fact that the state has 
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allowed for wrongful conviction civil suits against prosecutors for 
more than twenty-five years.201 Equally unpersuasive is the 
argument that honest prosecutors will become frequent targets of 
lawsuits when they prosecute and obtain lawful convictions in 
good faith only to later see the defendant exonerated.  The doctrine 
of qualified immunity for state and federal officials, promulgated 
by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, stands to prevent 
claims against such good faith prosecutions.202 Qualified, also 
known as “good faith” immunity, will shield honest prosecutors 
from such liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”203 
To create a more effective system of accountability among 
prosecutors, it is important that individual states and the federal 
government follow states that have passed legislation that provides 
civil remedies for the wrongfully convicted. In the federal courts, 
no longer should the wrongfully convicted rely on 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 for relief,204 as Section 1983 was historically a remedial 
pathway for victims of Southern racism in the late 19th century 
and not unscrupulous prosecutors.205 The United States therefore 
needs to pass specific legislation allowing for direct federal 
remedies against prosecutors who violate constitutional rights in 
securing convictions against the innocent. While it is likely that 
multiple lawsuits would be filed against prosecutors in the wake of 
such legislation, the 40 percent of the exonerated who have never 
received any compensation for their time they spent wrongfully 
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incarcerated206 would finally have the opportunity to receive 
compensation for the injustices committed against them. 
Consequently, the resulting media exposure of the instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct that bring these cases to bear and its 
ensuing cost to the taxpayers would result in a public call for more 
responsible prosecutorial procedures. This would serve to reward 
honest prosecutors and discipline the unethical, further facilitating 
a shift of prosecutorial culture and a greater internal system of 
checks for those prosecutors who might otherwise violate the law 
to obtain unfounded convictions. In the cases in which a defendant 
is wrongfully convicted as a result of ineffective assistance of 
defense counsel, the wrongfully convicted defendant would have a 
cause of action against that attorney. In faultless error cases in 
which neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney is found to 
be culpable for the wrongful conviction, an automatic statutory 
compensation for those convicted of crimes later found to be 
innocent, such as the Tim Cole Act in Texas, which provides the 
wrongfully convicted with a lump sum payment of $80,000 per 
year of incarceration as well as college tuition, would be 
appropriate.207 
C. Independent Disciplinary Review 
“When there is no penalty for failure, failures 
proliferate.”208 
– George Will, Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist209 
 
When investigative journalists for the Chicago Tribune began 
pouring over case records of overturned convictions, the single fact 
that appeared more consistently than all of the others was that the 
prosecutors responsible for wrongful convictions were never 
penalized for their actions.210 One example of this is the case of 
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former St. Louis city prosecutor Nels C. Moss Jr., whose conduct 
was formally challenged twenty-four times while he served as a 
prosecutor there.211 Those challenges resulted in findings that he 
committed reversible misconduct in seven of those cases, and was 
found to have committed non-reversible “prosecutorial error” in 
seventeen others.212 Moss, while scolded on record by at least one 
judge for his conduct deliberately designed to “poison the minds of 
the jurors regarding the defendant’s character,” was never 
punished for his wrongdoing and remains a licensed attorney in 
Missouri.213 In perhaps the most highly-publicized case of 
prosecutorial misconduct, former Durham County District 
Attorney Mike Nifong, who concealed exculpatory DNA evidence 
and continued to press charges against three Duke University 
students accused of rape, was ultimately fired, disbarred, and 
sentenced to one day in jail after the truth surfaced of his handling 
of that case.214  
The prosecutor is the most powerful actor in America’s 
criminal justice system.215 The decision to initiate criminal 
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proceedings, convene grand juries, grant immunity, negotiate and 
permit plea bargains, pursue statutory enhancements for certain 
crimes and decide whether to bring charges, what charges to bring, 
and when to bring them all fall within the discretionary authority 
of the prosecutor.216 While police departments have long had 
internal investigation bureaus and judges could be punished for 
“abuse of discretion” when determined to have acted improperly, 
prosecutors have long flown under the radar of accountability.217 
There is not a single prosecutor’s office that has yet to permit an 
independent review board to investigate complaints of misconduct, 
and while some states have passed laws that define standards for 
prosecutors, they are virtually never held to those standards.218 
While the American Bar Association, the Department of Justice, 
and several state prosecutors offices have promulgated standards of 
conduct specifically for prosecutors, there is no legal requirement 
for prosecutors to follow these rules and those who break them will 
only be held accountable within their offices.219 Likewise, the 
federal constitution offers no guidance on the issue of prosecutors 
who betray their oath to uphold justice.220 The irony here is 
glaring: those who are tasked with holding the public accountable 
for its actions are themselves never held accountable.  
A main reason for this gap in accountability is traced back to 
what proponents of prosecutorial immunity point to as a primary 
and acceptable substitution for independent review: accountability 
to the political electorate.221 The idea that prosecutors are 
accountable to the electorate arose out of the Jacksonian populist 
democracy of the 1820s.222 However, the lack of transparency in 
modern prosecutors’ offices due to private charging and 
negotiating practices has paired with other factors—such as media 
glamorization of prosecutors’ offices—to result in an ill-informed 
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public, eroding nearly all of the public’s electoral influence as an 
effective check on prosecutors who would otherwise commit 
misconduct.223 In fact, some prosecutors found to have concealed 
evidence or pursued erroneous charges end up moving on to higher 
offices, despite their actions.224  
The failure of the electoral system to act as an effective check 
on otherwise unfettered prosecutorial power became a major point 
of concern documented in six state-wide legal studies of the 
criminal justice system in the 1920s.225 The “Wickersham Report,” 
issued in 1934 by the National Commission of Law Observance 
and Enforcement, further criticized the total lack of prosecutorial 
accountability, stating specifically that elections failed to result in 
qualified candidates securing office and did not act as a proper 
check on the discretion of the prosecutor.226 “The people of the 
United States have traditionally feared concentration of great 
power in the hands of any one person, and it is surprising that the 
power of the prosecutor has been left intact as it is today,” wrote 
Earl H. DeLong and Newman F. Baker, two law scholars and 
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members of the Wickersham Commission.227 Since then, groups 
seeking reform of modern prosecution have consistently pointed to 
the need for an effective check on prosecutorial power in response 
to revelations of the hundreds of overturned cases in recent 
decades due to prosecutorial misconduct.228  
D. Effective Reforms 
This Note argues that the most effective reform—whereby 
prosecutors could become true ministers of justice—would require 
a three-tiered approach. The first of these tiers would involve 
cooperative federal and state-level legislation requiring prosecutors 
to establish uniform workable and enforceable standards as well as 
systems to monitor prosecutors’ adherence to these standards. This 
would include instituting a better record-keeping system designed 
to identify, log, and pass on to defense counsel any evidence that 
might tend to exculpate the accused. Prosecutors would be required 
to verify that they have reviewed all evidence available, and mark 
with their signatures whether evidence was turned over or denied 
to defense prior to trial. Given the extreme prevalence of falsified 
informant testimony in wrongful convictions,229 prosecutors would 
                                                          
227 Earl H. DeLong & Newman F. Baker, Provisions of Law Organizing the 
Office Prosecuting Attorney, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926, 934 (1933). 
228 See PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY 
OF GOOD INTENTIONS 173–85 (2000) (proposing a philosophical change through 
specified legislation designed to reign in the prosecutor’s control over charging); 
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 763–72 (1996) (proposing instituting enforceable standards 
for prosecutors); JOHN F. TERZANO, JOYCE A. MCGEE & ALANNA D. HOLT,  THE 
JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY 
REVIEW (2009), http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/pr-
improving-prosecutorial-accountability1.pdf (recommending a six-fold approach 
to reform, including instituting independent review boards, greater publication 
of instances of misconduct, and open-file discovery in criminal cases); James 
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1562–68 (1981) (suggesting required enforceable standards and greater record-
keeping practices). 
229 See WARDEN, supra note 121, at 3 (explaining that informant “snitch” 
testimony in exchange for more lenient sentences played a role in forty-six 
percent of the more than 100 death row exonerations since the 1970s). 
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be required to uniformly document all deals where informants 
testify against a defendant in exchange for leniency; prosecutors 
would then be required to turn that information over to defense.  
The second tier of reforms would require the creation of 
independent review boards attached to all prosecutors’ offices that 
would promptly investigate complaints filed by citizens and 
defense attorneys. This system would also institute individualized 
monitoring of prosecutors, including a publicly-accessible database 
in which the independent body would catalog meritorious 
complaints filed by defendants and the result of corresponding 
investigations into misconduct. When the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s Rampart Division’s widespread instances of abuse of 
authority were made public in the late 1990s, the community 
refused to accept a police force that saw itself as above the law.230 
The city ultimately allowed for federal reform of the Los Angeles 
Police, which led to a greater system of monitoring police officers, 
facilitated the system for filing and investigating complaints, and 
allowed the police to catalogue the complaints.231 These 
recommendations presuppose that the same would need to hold 
true for prosecutors. An independent review board would also have 
important data at its fingertips as a result of the systems for 
monitoring prosecutors previously suggested. This would enable a 
Board to apply more effective and informative scrutiny when 
allegations of misconduct arise. Relatively minor instances of 
misconduct could be logged in a prosecutor’s file with that office 
and would not ordinarily be subject to disciplinary action. 
However, repeated instances of misconduct or one showing of 
major misconduct (such as concealing clear exculpatory evidence 
known to the prosecutor) would be met with internal disciplinary 
action, which could include censure, suspension, or termination. 
The final tier of these reforms would deal with those 
exceptional cases in which a prosecutor acted knowingly, 
maliciously, and successfully to imprison a known-innocent 
defendant through abuse of his authority. The public has shown 
that it will not shy away from prosecuting corrupt cops who 
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knowingly commit crimes;232 as such, it is likely willing to 
prosecute corrupt prosecutors as well.  
The most egregious cases of prosecutorial misconduct call for 
new, specific legislation that would allow for criminal prosecutions 
of prosecutors, who by virtue of their authority deliberately 
conceal material exculpatory evidence or put on knowingly false 
material testimony to secure convictions. Some in the legal 
community have criticized the notion of determining when 
prosecutors presented certain evidence in bad faith and securing a 
conviction against a prosecutor for failing to turn over evidence 
that she may not have realized was exculpatory.233 However, the 
uniform monitoring and complaint logging system proposed above 
would serve as protection for the accused prosecutor by allowing 
investigators to review that prosecutor’s record and determine 
patterns of lawful and honest behavior that would bolster his or her 
credibility. 
CONCLUSION 
The American prosecutor’s job is both challenging and 
necessary for the continuation of a society free from those who 
would cause it harm. However, there must be a check on the power 
of those with the authority to take the life or liberty of any member 
of our society. While a great number of prosecutors respect this 
power and take on this responsibility with honor and integrity, 
there are far too many others who lose track of the dire 
responsibility and duty to justice that the job of a prosecutor 
requires. The prosecutor struggles everyday to strike a balance 
between society’s demands and those of justice. Only with 
additional, structured oversight to make sure that these men and 
women are living up to the oath that they swore to our society can 
our criminal justice system become a more effective institution to 
protect and exonerate the innocent and scrupulously punish the 
guilty. 
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